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Abstract
We present a strongly polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium in Arrow-Debreu
exchange markets with linear utilities. The main measure of progress is identifying a set of edges
that must correspond to best bang-per-buck ratios in every equilibrium, called the revealed edge
set. We use a variant of the combinatorial algorithm by Duan and Mehlhorn [12] to identify
a new revealed edge in a strongly polynomial number of iterations. Every time a new edge is
found, we use a subroutine to identify an approximately best possible solution corresponding to the
current revealed edge set. Finding the best solution can be reduced to solving a linear program.
Even though we are unable to solve this LP in strongly polynomial time, we show that it can
be approximated by a simpler LP with two variables per inequality that is solvable in strongly
polynomial time.
1 Introduction
The exchange market model has been introduced by Walras in 1874 [41]. In this model, a set of
agents arrive at a market with an initial endowment of divisible goods and have a utility function over
allocations of goods. Agents can use their revenue from selling their initial endowment to purchase
their preferred bundle of goods. In a market equilibrium, the prices are such that each agent can spend
their entire revenue on a bundle of goods that maximizes her utility at the given prices, and all goods
are fully sold.
The celebrated result of Arrow and Debreu [2] shows the existence of an equilibrium for a broad
class of utility functions. Computational aspects have been already addressed since the 19th century,
see e.g. [3], and polynomial time algorithms have been investigated in the theoretical computer science
community over the last twenty years; see the survey [4] for early work, and the references in [17] for
more recent developments.
In this paper we study the case where all utility functions are linear. Linear market models have
been extensively studied since 1950s; see [8] for an overview of earlier work. These models are also
appealing from a combinatorial optimization perspective due to their connection to classical network
flow models and their rich combinatorial structure. A well-studied special case of the exchange market
is the Fisher market setting, where every buyer arrives with a fixed budget instead of an endowment
of goods. Using network flow techniques, Devanur et al. [9] gave a polynomial-time combinatorial
algorithm that was followed by a series of further such algorithms [20, 36], including strongly polynomial
ones [30, 39]. In contrast, for the general exchange market the first combinatorial algorithm was
developed much later by Duan and Mehlhorn [12], and no strongly polynomial algorithm has been
known thus far.
Strongly polynomial algorithms and rational convex programs Assume that a problem is
given by an input of N rational numbers given in binary description. An algorithm for such a problem
is strongly polynomial (see [22, Section 1.3]), if it only uses elementary arithmetic operations (addition,
comparison, multiplication, and division), and the total number of such operations is bounded by
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poly(N). Further, the algorithm is required to run in polynomial space: that is, the size of the
numbers occurring throughout the algorithm remain polynomial in the size of the input. Here, the size
of a rational number p/q with integers p and q is defined as ⌈log2(|p|+ 1)⌉+ ⌈log2(|q|+ 1)⌉.
It is a major open question to find a strongly polynomial algorithm for linear programming. Such
algorithms are known for special classes of linear optimization problems. We do not present a com-
prehensive overview here but only highlight some examples: systems of linear equations with at most
two nonzero entries per inequality [1, 5, 26]; minimum cost circulations e.g. [21, 29, 33]; LPs with
bounded entries in the constraint matrix [34, 35]; generalized flow maximization [28, 40], and variants
of Markov Decision Processes [42, 44].
For nonlinear convex optimization, only sporadic results are known. The relevance of certain market
equilibrium problems in this context is that they can be described by rational convex programs, where
a rational optimal solution exists with encoding size bounded in the input size (see [37]). This property
gives hope for finding strongly polynomial algorithms.
The linear Fisher market equilibrium can be captured by two different convex programs, one by
Eisenberg and Gale [15], and one by Shmyrev [32]. These are special cases of natural convex extensions
of classical network flow models [38, 39]. In particular, the second model is a network flow problem
with a separable convex cost function; [39] provides a strongly polynomial algorithm for the linear
Fisher market using this general perspective.
The exchange market model cannot be described by such simple convex programs. A rational
convex program was given in [8], but the objective is not separable and hence the result in [39] cannot
be applied. Previous convex programs [6, 23, 27] included nonlinear constraints and did not appear
amenable for a combinatorial approach (see [8] for an overview).
Model Let A be the set of n agents. Without loss of generality, we can assume that there is one
unit in total of each divisible good, and that there is a one-to-one correspondence between agents and
goods: agent i brings the entire unit of the i-th good, gi to the market. If agent i buys xij units of good
gj , her utility is
∑
j uijxij , where uij is the utility of agent i for a unit amount of good gj . Given prices
p = (pi)i∈A, the bundle that maximizes the utility of agent i is any choice of maximum bang-per-buck
goods, that is, goods that maximize the ratio uij/pj . The prices p and allocations (xij)i,j∈A form a
market equilibrium, if (i)
∑
i∈A xij = 1 for all j, that is, every good is fully sold; (ii) pi =
∑
j∈A pjxij for
all i, that is, every agent spends her entire revenue; and (iii) xij > 0 implies that uij/pj = maxk uik/pk,
that is, all purchases maximize bang-per-buck.
Algorithms for the linear exchange market A finite time algorithm based on Lemke’s scheme [25]
was obtained by Eaves [13]. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium was
described by Gale [16]. The first polynomial-time algorithms for the problem were given by Jain [23]
using the ellipsoid method and by Ye [43] using an interior point method. The combinatorial algorithm
of Duan and Mehlhorn [12] builds on the algorithm [9] for linear Fisher markets. An improved variant
was given in [11] with the current best weakly polynomial running time O(n7 log3(nU)), assuming
all uij values are integers between 0 and U . A main measure of progress in these algorithms is the
increase in prices. However, the upper bound on the prices depends on the uij values; therefore, such
an analysis can only provide a weakly polynomial bound. The existence of a strongly polynomial
algorithm is described in [12] as a major open question. There is a number of simple algorithms for
computing an approximate equilibrium [10, 18, 19, 24], but these do not give rise to polynomial-time
exact algorithms.
Our result We provide a strongly polynomial algorithm for linear exchange markets with running
time O(n9m log2 n), where m is the number of pairs (i, gj) with uij > 0; clearly, m ≤ n2. Let us give
an overview of the main ideas and techniques. Let F ∗ denote the set of edges (pairs of agents and
goods) that correspond to a best bang-per-buck transaction in every equilibrium. In the algorithm, we
maintain a set F ⊆ F ∗ called revealed edges, and the main progress is adding a new edge in strongly
polynomial time. At a high level, this approach resembles that of [39], which extends Orlin’s approach
for minimum-cost circulations [29].
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In a money allocation (p, f), (pi)i∈A is a set of prices and (fij)i,j∈A represent the amount of money
paid for good gj by agent i; fij may only be positive for maximum bang-per-buck pairs. In the
algorithm we work with a money allocation where goods may not be fully sold and agents may have
leftover money; we let ‖s(p, f)‖1 denote the total surplus money left, and ‖s(p, f)‖∞ the maximum
surplus of any good. It can be shown that if fij > ‖s(p, f)‖1 in a money allocation, then (i, gj) ∈ F
∗.
This is analogous to the method of identifying abundant arcs for minimum cost flows by Orlin [29].
We use a variant of the Duan-Mehlhorn (DM) algorithm to identify abundant arcs. We show that
the potential φ(p, f) = ‖s(p, f)‖∞/(
∏
j pj)
1/n decreases geometrically in the algorithm; from this fact,
it is not difficult to see that an arc with fij > ‖s(p, f)‖1 appears in a strongly polynomial number of
iterations, yielding the first revealed arc. We need to modify the DM algorithm [12] so that, among
other reasons, the potential decreases geometrically when we run the algorithm starting with any
arbitrary price vector p; see Remark 5.1 in Section 5 for all the differences.
To identify subsequent revealed arcs, we need a more flexible framework and a second subroutine.
We work with the more general concept of F -allocations, where the money amount fij could be negative
if (i, gj) ∈ F . This is a viable relaxation since an F -equilibrium (namely, a market equilibrium with
possibly negative allocations in F ) can be efficiently turned into a proper market equilibrium, provided
that F ⊆ F ∗. Given a set F of revealed arcs, our Price Boost subroutine finds an approximately optimal
F -allocation using only edges in F . Namely, the subroutine finds an F -equilibrium if there exists
one; otherwise, it finds an F -allocation that is zero outside F , and subject to this, it approximately
minimizes φ(p, f). This will provide the initial prices for the next iteration of the DM subroutine.
Since DM decreases φ(p, f) geometrically, after a strongly polynomial number iterations it will need
to send a substantial amount of flow on an edge outside F , providing the next revealed edge.
Let us now discuss the Price Boost subroutine. The analogous subproblem for Fisher markets in
[39] reduces to a simple variant of the Floyd-Warshall algorithm. For exchange markets, we show that
optimizing φ(p, f) can be captured by a linear program. A strongly polynomial LP algorithm would
therefore immediately provide the desired subroutine. Alas, this LP is not contained in any special
class of LP where strongly polynomial algorithms are currently known.
We will exploit the following special structure of the LP. We can eliminate the fij variables and
only work with price variables. The objective is to maximize the sum of all variables over a feasible
set of the form P ∩ P ′. The first polyhedron P is defined by inequalities with one positive and one
nonnegative variable per inequality. The constraint matrix defining the second polyhedron P ′ is what
we call a Z+-matrix: all off-diagonal elements are nonpositive but all column sums are nonnegative.
This corresponds to a submatrix of the transposed of a weighted Laplacian matrix. In case we only
had constraints of the form P , classical results [1, 5, 26] would provide a strongly polynomial running
time. To deal with the constraints defining P ′, we approximate our LP by a second LP that can be
solved in strongly polynomial time.
More precisely, we replace the second polyhedron P ′ by Q such that P ′ ⊆ Q ⊆ n2P ′, and that Q
is also a system with one positive and one nonnegative variable per inequality. Thus, the algorithms
[1, 5, 26] are applicable to maximize the sum of the variables over P ∩Q in strongly polynomial time.
For an optimal solution p¯, the vector p¯/n2 is feasible to the original LP and the objective value is
within a factor n2 of the optimum. For the purposes of identifying a new revealed arc in the algorithm,
such an approximation of the optimal φ(p, f) value already suffices.
The construction of the approximating polyhedron Q is obtained via a general method applicable
for systems given by Z+-matrices. We show that for such systems, Gaussian elimination can be used
to generate valid constraints with at most two nonzero variables per row. Moreover, we show that the
intersection of all relevant such constraints provides a good approximation of the original polyhedron.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces basic definitions and notation.
Section 3 describes the overall algorithm by introducing the notion of F -allocations, the main potential,
and the two necessary subroutines. Section 4 proves the lemmas necessary for identifying revealed
edges. Section 5 presents the first of these two subroutines, a variant of the Duan-Mehlhorn algorithm.
Section 6 shows how the second subroutine, Price Boost, can be reduced to solving an LP. Section 7
exhibits the polyhedral approximation result for Z+-matrices. Section 8 concludes with some open
questions.
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2 Preliminaries
For a positive integer t, we let [t] := {1, 2, . . . , t}, and for k < t, we let [k, t] := {k, k + 1, . . . , t}. For a
vector a ∈ Rn, we let
‖a‖1 :=
n∑
i=1
|ai|, ‖a‖2 :=
√√√√ n∑
i=1
a2i , and ‖a‖∞ := max
i∈[n]
|ai|
denote the ℓ1, ℓ2, and ℓ∞-norms, respectively. Further, we let supp(a) ⊆ [n] denote the support of the
vector a ∈ Rn, that is, supp(a) := {i ∈ [n] | ai 6= 0}. For a subset S ⊆ [n], we let a(S) :=
∑
i∈S ai.
The linear exchange market We let A := [n] denote the set of agents, G := {g1, g2, . . . , gn} denote
the set of goods, and uij ≥ 0 denote the utility of agent i for a unit amount of good gj. Let E ⊆ A×G
denote the set of pairs (i, gj) such that uij > 0; let m := |E|. We will assume that for each i ∈ A there
exists a gj ∈ G such that uij > 0, and for each gj ∈ G there exists an i ∈ A such that uij > 0. Hence,
m ≥ n.
The goods are divisible and there is one unit of each in total. Agent i arrives to the market with
her initial endowment comprising exactly the unit of good gi. As mentioned in the introduction, the
general case with an arbitrary set of goods and arbitrary initial endowments can be easily reduced to
this setting; see [8, 23].
Let p = (pj)gj∈G denote the prices where pj is the price of good gj. Given prices p, we let
αi := max
gk∈G
uik
pk
, ∀i ∈ A.
For each agent i ∈ A, the goods satisfying equality here are called maximum bang-per-buck (MBB)
goods; for such a good gj , (i, gj) is called an MBB edge. We let MBB(p) ⊆ E denote the set of MBB
edges at prices p.
Definition 2.1. Let f = (fij)i∈A,gj∈G denote the money flow where fij is the money spent by agent i
on good gj . We say that (p, f) is a money allocation if
(i) p > 0, and f ≥ 0;
(ii) supp(f) ⊆ MBB(p);
(iii)
∑
gj∈G
fij ≤ pi for every agent i ∈ A;
(iv)
∑
i∈A fij ≤ pj for every good gj ∈ G.
For the money allocation (p, f), the surplus of agent i is defined as
ci(p, f) := pi −
∑
gj∈G
fij,
and the surplus of good gj ∈ G is defined as
sj(p, f) := pj −
∑
i∈A
fij.
Parts (iii) and (iv) in the definition of the money allocation require that the surplus of all agents and
goods are nonnegative. We let c(p, f) := (ci(p, f))i∈A and s(p, f) := (sj(p, f))gj∈G denote the surplus
vectors of the agents and the goods, respectively. Clearly, ‖s(p, f)‖1 = ‖c(p, f)‖1 , and ‖s(p, f)‖∞ ≤
‖s(p, f)‖1 ≤ n‖s(p, f)‖∞ .
Definition 2.2. A money allocation (p, f) is called a market equilibrium if ‖s(p, f)‖1 = 0.
4
Existence of an equilibrium A market equilibrium may not exist for certain inputs. For example,
consider a market with 3 agents and 3 goods, where agent i brings one unit of good gi for i = 1, 2, 3.
Let E = {(1, g1), (1, g2), (2, g3), (3, g3)}. Clearly, in this market, at any prices, Agent 3 will consume
the entire g3. If p2 > 0, then Agent 2 will demand a non-zero amount of g3, and therefore no market
equilibrium exists.
A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium can be given as follows. Let
us define the directed graph (A, E¯), where (i, j) ∈ E¯ if and only if uij > 0 (that is, if (i, gj) ∈ E).
Lemma 2.1 ([16, 8]). There exists a market equilibrium if and only if for every strongly connected
component S ⊆ A of the digraph (A, E¯), if |S| = 1, then there is a loop incident to the node in S.
This condition can be easily checked in strongly polynomial time. Further, it is easy to see that if
the above condition holds, then finding an equilibrium in an arbitrary input can be reduced to finding
an equilibrium in an input where the digraph (A, E¯) is strongly connected. Thus, we will assume the
following throughout the paper:
The graph (A, E¯) is strongly connected. (⋆)
3 The overall algorithm
In this section, we describe the overall algorithm. We formulate the statements that are needed to
prove our main theorem:
Theorem 3.1. There exists a strongly polynomial algorithm that computes a market equilibrium in
linear exchange markets in time O(n9m log2 n).
We start by introducing the concepts of revealed edges, F -allocations, and balanced F -flows.
3.1 Revealed edges
Throughout the paper, we let F ∗ ⊆ E denote the set of edges (i, gj) ∈ E that are MBB edges for every
market equilibrium (p, f). In the algorithm, we will maintain a subset of edges F ⊆ F ∗ that will be
called the revealed edge set. This is initialized as F = ∅.
Definition 3.2. For an edge set F ⊆ E, (p, f) is an F -money allocation, or F -allocation in short, if
(i) p > 0, and fij ≥ 0 for (i, gj) /∈ F ;
(ii) supp(f) ∪ F ⊆ MBB(p);
(iii)
∑
gj∈G
fij ≤ pi for every agent i ∈ A;
(iv)
∑
i∈A fij ≤ pj, for every good gj ∈ G.
An F -allocation is called an F -equilibrium if ‖s(p, f)‖1 = 0.
Note that fij could be negative for (i, gj) ∈ F . A ∅-allocation simply corresponds to a money
allocation.
The main progress step in the algorithm will be adding new edges to F . This will be enabled by
the following lemma; the proof is deferred to Section 4.
Lemma 3.1. Let F ⊆ F ∗, and let (p, f) be an F -allocation. If fkℓ > ‖s(p, f)‖1 for an edge (k, gℓ) ∈ E,
then (k, gℓ) ∈ F
∗.
Our algorithm will obtain an F -equilibrium. Whereas an F -equilibrium is not necessarily an
equilibrium, the following holds true:
Lemma 3.2. Let F ⊆ F ∗, and assume we are given an F -equilibrium (p, f). Then a market equilibrium
(p, f ′) can be obtained in O(nm) time.
We let Final-Flow(p) denote the algorithm as in the Lemma. This is a maximum flow computa-
tion in an auxiliary network, as described in the proof in Section 4.
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Algorithm 1: Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium
Input : Set A of agents, set G of goods, and utilities (uij)i∈A,gj∈G
Output: Market equilibrium (p, f)
1 F ← ∅;
2 repeat
3 (pˆ, fˆ)← Boost(F ) // Theorem 3.4
4 (p, f)← DM(F, pˆ) // Theorem 3.5
5 F ← F ∪ {(i, gj) | fij > ‖s(p, f)‖1} // Lemma 3.1
6 until ‖s(p, f)‖1 = 0
7 f ←Final-Flow(p) // Lemma 3.2
8 return (p, f)
3.2 Balanced flows
Balanced flows play a key role in the Duan-Mehlhorn algorithm [12], as well as in previous algorithms
for Fisher market models [9, 20, 36]. We now introduce the natural extension for F -allocations.
Definition 3.3. Given an edge set F ⊆ E and prices p, we say that (p, f) is a balanced F -flow, if
(p, f) is an F -allocation that minimizes ‖s(p, f)‖1 , and subject to that, it minimizes ‖c(p, f)‖2 .
Lemma 3.3. Given F ⊆ E and prices p such that F ⊆ MBB(p), a balanced F -flow can be computed
in O(n2m) time.
We let Balanced(F, p) denote the subroutine guaranteed by the Lemma. The proof in Ap-
pendix A.1 follows the same lines as in [9, 12], by computing at most n maximum flows in an auxiliary
graph.
3.3 The algorithm
The overall algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1. The main progress is gradually expanding a revealed
edge set F ⊆ F ∗, initialized as F = ∅. Every cycle of the algorithm performs the subroutines Boost(F )
and DM(F, pˆ), and at least one new edge is added to F at every such cycle. Once an F -equilibrium
is obtained for the current F , we use the subroutine Final-Flow(p) as in Lemma 3.2 to compute a
market equilibrium.
We now introduce the key potential measures used in analysis. For an F -allocation (p, f), we define
φ(p, f) :=
‖s(p, f)‖∞
(
∏n
j=1 pj)
1/n
.
Note that this is invariant under scaling, i.e. φ(p, f) = φ(αp, αf) for any α > 0. Further, (p, f) is an
F -equilibrium if and only if φ(p, f) = 0. For a given F ⊆ F ∗, we define
Ψ(F ) := min{φ(p, f) : (p, f) is an F -allocation, supp(f) ⊆ F}. (1)
Theorem 3.4. There exists a strongly polynomial time algorithm that for any input F ⊆ E, returns in
time O(n4 log2 n) an F -allocation (pˆ, fˆ) with supp(fˆ) ⊆ F such that Ψ(F ) ≤ φ(pˆ, fˆ) ≤ (n− 1)2Ψ(F ).
The algorithm in the theorem will be denoted as Boost(F ), and is described in Section 6. In
particular, if Ψ(F ) = 0, then Boost(F ) returns an F -equilibrium.
The second main subroutine DM(F, pˆ), is a variant of the Duan-Mehlhorn algorithm [12], de-
scribed in Section 5. As the input, it uses the prices pˆ obtained in the F -allocation (pˆ, fˆ) returned
by Boost(F ), and outputs an F -allocation (p, f) such that either ‖s(p, f)‖1 = 0, that is, an F -
equilibrium, or it is guaranteed that fij > ‖s(p, f)‖1 for some (i, gj) ∈ E \ F connecting two different
connected components of F . Such an edge (i, gj) can be added to F by Lemma 3.1. The following
simple lemma asserts the existence of such an edge.
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Lemma 3.4. Let (p, f) be an F -allocation such that φ(p, f) < Ψ(F )/(n(m+1)). Then, fij > ‖s(p, f)‖1
for at least one edge (i, gj) ∈ E \ F such that i and gj are in two different undirected connected
components of F .
Proof. For a contradiction, assume fij ≤ ‖s(p, f)‖1 for every (i, gj) ∈ E \ F where i and gj are in
different connected components of F . Let us define f ′ as follows. We start by setting f ′ = f ; then, for
every (i, gj) ∈ E \ F where i and gj are in the same component, we reroute fij units of flow from i to
gj using a path in F . Such a path may contain both forward and reverse edges; we increase the flow
on forward edges and decrease it on reverse edges. Further, we set f ′ij := 0 for (i, gj) ∈ E \ F if i and
gj are in different connected components of F . The assumption yields
‖s(p, f ′)‖∞ ≤ ‖s(p, f
′)‖1 ≤ (m+ 1)‖s(p, f)‖1 ≤ n(m+ 1)‖s(p, f)‖∞ ,
and therefore
φ(p, f ′) ≤ n(m+ 1)φ(p, f) < Ψ(F ),
a contradiction to the definition of Ψ(F ), since supp(f ′) ⊆ F .
Theorem 3.5. There exists a strongly polynomial O(n8m log2 n) time algorithm, that, for a given
F ⊆ E and prices pˆ, computes an F -allocation (p, f) such that
φ(p, f) ≤
φ(pˆ, f˜)
n4(m+ 1)
,
where f˜ is the balanced flow computed by Balanced(F, pˆ).
The algorithm DM(F, pˆ) given in Section 5 will satisfy the assertion of this theorem. Using these
claims, we are ready to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. By Lemma 3.4, the number of connected components of F decreases after every
cycle of Algorithm 1; thus, the total number of cycles is ≤ 2n − 1. Consider any cycle. Let (pˆ, fˆ)
denote that F -allocation returned by Boost(F ) with φ(pˆ, fˆ) ≤ (n − 1)2Ψ(F ), and let (pˆ, f˜) denote
the balanced F -flow at prices pˆ. Then,
‖s(pˆ, f˜)‖∞ ≤ ‖s(pˆ, f˜)‖1 ≤ ‖s(pˆ, fˆ)‖1 ≤ n‖s(pˆ, fˆ)‖∞ ,
since (pˆ, f˜) minimizes ‖s(pˆ, f˜)‖1 among all F -allocations. Therefore φ(pˆ, f˜) < n
3Ψ(F ). Theorem 3.5
guarantees that DM(F, pˆ) finds an F -allocation (p, f) with φ(p, f) < Ψ(F )/(n(m + 1)). Lemma 3.4
guarantees that F is extended by at least one new edge in this cycle. The overall running time
estimation is dominated by the running time estimation of the calls to DM.
4 F -allocations and F -equilibria
This section is devoted to the proof of the Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, which enable us to add new edges to
the revealed set F , as well as to convert an F -equilibrium to an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. The claim is obvious if (k, gℓ) ∈ F ; for the rest of the proof we therefore assume
(k, gℓ) /∈ F . Let (p′, f ′) be a market equilibrium. Every edge in F is an MBB-edge for (p, f) by the
definition of an F -allocation, and also for (p′, f ′) because of F ⊆ F ∗. Since equilibrium prices are scale
invariant in linear exchange markets, we can assume that p′ℓ = pℓ. Let T ⊆ G be the set of goods
whose prices at p′ are at least the prices at p, i.e., T := {gj ∈ G | p′j ≥ pj}. Clearly, gℓ ∈ T . Let Γp′(T )
be the set of agents who have MBB edges to goods in T at p′, i.e.,
Γp′(T ) := {i ∈ A | ∃gj ∈ T, (i, gj) ∈ MBB(p
′)} .
Observe that agents of Γp′(T ) do not have MBB edges to goods in G \ T when prices are p.
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For a contradiction, suppose (k, gℓ) /∈ MBB(p′). In that case, it follows that k 6∈ Γp′(T ). Indeed,
if there existed a good gj ∈ T such that (k, gj) ∈ MBB(p′), then we would get ukℓ/pℓ = ukℓ/p′ℓ <
uij/p
′
j ≤ uij/pj, a contradiction to (k, gℓ) ∈ MBB(p).
Consider the goods in T at prices p. Since no good is oversold, we have∑
i∈A,gj∈T
fij ≤ p(T ) .
Also note that fij ≥ 0 whenever i ∈ A \ Γp′(T ) and gj ∈ T . This is because fij could be negative only
on edges in F ; however, for every (i, gj) ∈ F such that gj ∈ T , we must have i ∈ Γp′(T ), since all edges
in F have to be MBB in every equilibrium. Therefore, the previous inequality implies∑
i∈Γp′(T ),gj∈T
fij + fkl ≤ p(T ) .
The agents in Γp′(T ) do not have MBB edges at price p to goods in G \ T , thus, the first term in the
left hand side is the total money they spend. Since their total surplus is at most ‖s(p, f)‖1 , we obtain
p(Γp′(T )) ≤ p(T )− fkℓ + ‖s(p, f)‖1 .
Using fkℓ > ‖s(p, f)‖1 and breaking p(Γp′(T )) into two parts, we can rewrite the above as∑
j∈Γp′(T ),gj 6∈T
pj <
∑
j /∈Γp′(T ),gj∈T
pj . (2)
Let us now examine the market equilibrium (p′, f ′), where f ′ ≥ 0 and f ′ij > 0 is allowed only for the
MBB edges at p′. Since every agent spends their budget exactly at equilibrium, we have
p′(Γp′(T )) =
∑
i∈Γp′(T ),gj∈G
f ′ij .
Further, since there are no MBB edges at prices p′ from agents outside Γp′(T ) to goods in T , we obtain
p′(Γp′(T )) =
∑
i∈Γp′ (T ),gj∈G
f ′ij ≥
∑
i∈Γp′(T ),gj∈T
f ′ij = p
′(T ) .
Again we can rewrite the above as ∑
j∈Γp′(T ),gj 6∈T
p′j ≥
∑
j /∈Γp′(T ),gj∈T
p′j . (3)
Now, since p′j ≥ pj for gj ∈ T and p
′
j < pj for gj 6∈ T , (2) and (3) give a contradiction.
We formulate a simple corollary that will be needed in the proof of Lemma 3.2.
Corollary 4.1. If F ⊆ F ∗, then for every F -equilibrium f , supp(f) ⊆ F ∗.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. An F -equilibrium (p, f) may not be a market equilibrium since f can have neg-
ative values on some edges in F . If that is the case, we find a flow f˜ such that (p, f˜) is a market
equilibrium as follows.
Let us construct the network N(p) on vertex set A ∪ G ∪ {s, t}, where s is a source node and t is
a sink node, and the following set of edges: (s, i) with capacity pi for each i ∈ A, (gj , t) with capacity
pj for each gj ∈ G, and (i, gj) with infinite capacity for each (i, gj) ∈ MBB(p). Let us use Orlin’s
algorithm [31] to obtain a maximum s− t flow f˜ in N(p) in time O(nm).
If f˜ saturates all edges out of s (equivalently, all edges into t), then clearly (p, f˜) is a market
equilibrium. We will show that this is indeed the case.
Let (p′, f ′) be an equilibrium. Since equilibrium prices are invariant to scaling by a positive constant,
we can assume that
∑
gj∈G
p′j =
∑
gj∈G
pj . If p′ = p, then clearly (p, f˜) is an equilibrium. For the
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other case, p′ 6= p, let E¯ := F ∪ supp(f), and let E′ := MBB(p′). Corollary 4.1 and the definition of
F ∗ imply E¯ ⊆ F ∗ ⊆ E′.
Next, let α := maxgj∈G{p
′
j/pj}, and S := {j ∈ G | p
′
j/pj = α}. Let Γ(S) be the set of agents who
have at least one MBB edge to goods in S when prices are p′, i.e.,
Γ(S) = {i ∈ A | ∃gj ∈ S, (i, gj) ∈ E
′}.
We must have ∑
i∈Γ(S)
p′i ≥
∑
gj∈S
p′j . (4)
Now consider the connected components of the bipartite graph (A ∪ G, E¯). Since E¯ ⊆ E′, there
are connected components C1, . . . , Cℓ of (A ∪ G, E¯) such that
⋃ℓ
k=1(G ∩ Ck) = S. Furthermore, we
also have
⋃ℓ
k=1(A ∩Ck) = Γ(S), because prices of goods in S are increased by the largest factor when
we go from p to p′, and E¯ ⊆ E′. At the F -equilibrium (p, f), we have∑
i∈Γ(S)
pi =
∑
gj∈S
pj . (5)
The equations (4) and (5) imply that
∑
i∈Γ(S) p
′
i =
∑
gj∈S
p′j and S = {gj ∈ G | j ∈ Γ(S)}, i.e., the set
of goods brought by agents in Γ(S) is exactly equal to S. This further implies that f ′ for agents in Γ(S)
and for goods in S is supported only on the MBB(p) edges between them, and hence f˜ must saturate
all agents in Γ(S) (and equivalently, all goods in S) because the set of MBB edges between Γ(S) and
S remains same at p and p′. Next, we remove the agents in Γ(S) and goods in S, and repeat the same
analysis on the remaining set of agents and goods. This proves that (p, f˜) is a market equilibrium.
5 The Duan-Mehlhorn (DM) subroutine
In this section, we present a variant of the Duan-Mehlhorn (DM) algorithm [12] as a subroutine
DM(F, pˆ) in Algorithm 2. The input is a revealed edge set F and prices pˆ such that F ⊆ MBB(pˆ), and
the output is either an F -equilibrium, or an F -allocation (p, f) where fij > ‖s(p, f)‖1 for some (i, gj) ∈
E \ F connecting two different components of F . The modifications compared to the original DM
algorithm are listed in Remark 5.1. We now provide a description where the subroutine terminates once
an arc with fij > ‖s(p, f)‖1 is identified. The variant as required in Theorem 3.5 can be obtained by
simply by removing the termination condition, and letting the algorithm run for O(n6 log2 n) iterations
of the outer loop.
We call one execution of the outer loop a phase, and one execution of the inner loop an iteration.
Algorithm 2 first computes a balanced flow f using the subroutine Balanced(F, p) as in Lemma 3.3.
Then, the agents are sorted in decreasing order of surplus. Without loss of generality, we assume that
c1(p, f) ≥ · · · ≥ cn(p, f). Then, we find the smallest ℓ for which the ratio cℓ(p, f)/cℓ+1(p, f) is more
than 1 + 1/n. If there is no such ℓ then we let ℓ := n. Let S be the set of first ℓ agents, and let Γ(S)
be the set of goods for which there is a non-zero flow from agents in S. Since f is balanced, the agents
outside S have zero flow to goods in Γ(S), i.e., fij = 0,∀i 6∈ S, gj ∈ Γ(S) and the surplus of every good
in Γ(S) is zero. We set γ to 1 before we go into the inner loop.
Next, the algorithm runs the inner loop where it increases the prices of goods in Γ(S) and the flow
between agents in S and goods in Γ(S) by a multiplicative factor x ≥ 1 until one of the three events
occurs. Observe that except for the MBB edges (i, gj) where i /∈ S, gj ∈ Γ(S), all MBB edges remain
MBB with this price change, and the surplus of every good in Γ(S) remains zero. When prices of goods
in Γ(S) increase, an edge (i, gj) from i ∈ S and gj 6∈ Γ(S) can become MBB. We need to stop when
such an event occurs in order to maintain an F -allocation. This is captured by Event 1. In Event 2, we
stop when the surplus of an agent i ∈ S becomes equal to either the surplus of an agent i′ 6∈ S or zero.
Let us note that ci(p, f) ≥ 0 is maintained throughout; we use the expression max{maxi/∈S ci(p, f), 0}
to also cover the possible case S = [n]. In Event 3, we stop when γx becomes 1 + 1/(56e2n3).
If Event 1 occurs, then we have a new MBB edge (a, gb) from a ∈ S to gb 6∈ Γ(S). Using this new
edge, it is now possible to decrease the surplus of agent a and increase the surpluses of agents i 6∈ S
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Algorithm 2: DM(F, pˆ)
Input : Utilities (uij)i∈A,gj∈G, an edge set F ⊆ E, and prices pˆ with F ⊆ MBB(pˆ).
Output: An F -equilibrium (p, f) or an F -allocation (p, f) such that fij > ‖s(p, f)‖1 for an
(i, gj) ∈ E \ F , where i and gj are in different connected components of F .
1 p← pˆ; f ← Balanced(F, p) // Lemma 3.3
2 repeat
3 Sort the agents in decreasing order of surplus, i.e., c1(p, f) ≥ c2(p, f) ≥ . . . ≥ cn(p, f)
4 Find the smallest ℓ for which cℓ(p, f)/cℓ+1(p, f) > 1 + 1/n, and let ℓ = n when there is no
such ℓ.
5 S ← [ℓ]; Γ(S) = {gj ∈ G | ∃i ∈ S : fij 6= 0}
6 γ ← 1
7 repeat
8 x← 1; Define pj ← xpj,∀gj ∈ Γ(S), fij ← xfij,∀i ∈ S,∀gj ∈ Γ(S)
// ci(p, f) and sj(p, f) change accordingly
9 Increase x continuously up from 1 until one of the following events occurs
10 Event 1: A new edge, say (a, gb), becomes MBB // a ∈ S, gb 6∈ Γ(S)
11 Event 2: mini∈S ci(p, f) = max{maxi 6∈S ci(p, f), 0} // Balancing
12 Event 3: γx = 1 + 1/(56e2n3) // Price-rise
13 if Event 1 occurs then
14 c˜i(p, f)← ci(p, f), ∀i ∈ S \ {a}
15 c˜a(p, f)← ca(p, f)− pb
16 c˜i(p, f)← ci(p, f) + fib, ∀i /∈ S
17 if ∃i ∈ A \ S s.t. (i, gb) ∈ F or mini∈S c˜i(p, f) ≤ max{maxi/∈S c˜i(p, f), 0} then
18 break // break from the inner loop
19 fib ← 0,∀i ∈ A; fab = pb; Γ(S)← Γ(S) ∪ {gb}; γ ← γx
20 until Event 2 or 3 occurs
21 f ← Balanced(F, p)
22 until either fij > ‖s(p, f)‖1 for an edge (i, gj) ∈ E \ F with i and gj in different components of
F , or ‖s(p, f)‖1 = 0
23 return (p, f)
by increasing fab and decreasing fib. We next check if this can lead to making the surplus of an agent
i ∈ S and i′ /∈ S equal. Observe that it is always possible if there exists an edge (i′, gb) ∈ F . If yes,
then we break from the inner loop, otherwise we update flow so that agent a buys the entire good gb,
add gb to Γ(S), update γ to γx, and go for another iteration.
Lemma 5.1. The number of iterations in a phase is at most n.
Proof. Consider the iterations of a phase. At the beginning of every iteration, the size of Γ(S) grows
by 1, and hence there cannot be more than n iterations in a phase.
When we break from the inner loop, we recompute a balanced flow and then check if either ‖s(p, f)‖1
is zero or there is an edge (i, gj) /∈ F with fij > ‖s(p, f)‖1 connecting two different components of
F . If yes, then we return the current (p, f), otherwise we go for another phase. Next, we show that
(p, f) remains an F -allocation throughout the algorithm, which implies that the algorithm returns an
F -allocation.
Lemma 5.2. The output (p, f) of Algorithm 2 is an F -allocation.
Proof. We only need to show that F ⊆MBB(p) throughout the algorithm. Observe that an MBB edge
(i, gj) becomes non-MBB only if i /∈ S and gj ∈ Γ(S), where S and Γ(S) are obtained with respect to
a balanced flow f . If an edge (i, gj) ∈ F is such that i /∈ S and gj ∈ Γ(S) then it contradicts that f is
a balanced flow because the edges in F are allowed to carry negative flow.
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The running time analysis of Algorithm 2 is based on the evolution of the norm ‖c(p, f)‖2 and
prices p. If a phase terminates due to Event 3, then we call it price-rise, otherwise balancing. The next
two lemmas are crucial that eventually imply that the potential function φ(p, f) decreases substantially
within a strongly polynomial number of phases.
Lemma 5.3. In Algorithm 2, the price of every good monotonically increases and the total surplus,
i.e., ‖s(p, f)‖1 , monotonically decreases.
Proof. Clearly, the price of every good monotonically increases in Algorithm 2. During a price increase
step, sj(p, f) = 0 is maintained for every gj ∈ Γ(S), and sj(p, f) does not change for gj ∈ G \ Γ(S).
If the allocation changes during Event 1, then sb(p, f) decreases to 0, and the other surpluses remain
unchanged. When a balanced flow is recomputed at the end of a phase, then ‖s(p, f)‖1 can only
decrease.
The proof of the next lemma is an adaptation of the proof in [11], and it is given in Appendix A.2.
The definition of N(p, F ) is given in Appendix A.1
Lemma 5.4. Let f be a balanced flow in N(p, F ) at the beginning of a phase, and let (p′, f ′) be the
prices and flow at the end of the phase. Then
(i)
∏n
j=1 p
′
j ≥
(
1 + 1
Cn3
)∏n
j=1 pj in a price-rise phase, and
(ii) ‖c(p′, f ′)‖2 ≤ ‖c(p, f)‖2/
(
1 + 1
Cn3
)
in a balancing phase,
where C = 56e2.
Lemma 5.5. The number of arithmetic operations in a phase of Algorithm 2 is O(n2m).
Proof. From Lemma 5.1, the number of iterations in a phase is at most n. In each iteration, we find the
minimum x where one of the events occur, which takes at most O(n2) arithmetic operations. If Event
1 occurs, then we define another surplus vector c˜(p, f), and based on this we decide to exit from the
inner loop. This requires additional O(n2) arithmetic operations. In total, each iteration takes O(n2)
arithmetic operations. The steps before the inner loop like sorting etc. takes O(n log n) arithmetic
operations. We compute a balanced flow after exiting from the inner loop, in time O(n2m) according
to Lemma 3.3. Overall, each phase takes O(n2m) arithmetic operations.
In the next lemma, we show that the potential function φ(p, f) decreases by a large factor within
a strongly polynomial number of phases. This together with Lemmas 3.4 and 3.1 imply that every
major cycle terminates in strongly polynomial time.
Lemma 5.6. The potential function φ(p, f) decreases by a factor of at least 1/nγ in 4(2+γ)2C2n6 ln2 n
phases of Algorithm 2 for any γ > 0, where C = 56e2.
Proof. Every phase of Algorithm 2 is either price-rise or balancing. Using ‖s(p, f)‖1/n ≤ ‖s(p, f)‖∞ ≤
‖s(p, f)‖1 , we have the following inequality:
‖s(p, f)‖1
n(
∏
j pj)
1/n
≤ φ(p, f) =
‖s(p, f)‖∞
(
∏
j pj)
1/n
≤
‖s(p, f)‖1
(
∏
j pj)
1/n
. (6)
Consider a sequence of 4(2+ γ)2C2n6 ln2 n phases. If there are consecutive 2(2+ γ)Cn3 lnn balancing
phases in the sequence, then using the inequality ex/2 ≤ 1 + x for |x| < 1 with Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4,
we get that ‖c(p, f)‖2 decreases by a factor of at least 1/n2+γ. This further implies that the ℓ1 norm,
i.e., ‖s(p, f)‖1 , decreases by a factor of at least 1/n1.5+γ .
If there are no consecutive 2(2 + γ)Cn3 lnn balancing phases in the sequence, then this implies
that there are at least 2(2 + γ)Cn3 lnn price-rise phases. In that case, the geometric mean of prices,
i.e., (
∏
j pj)
1/n, increases by a factor of at least n2+γ . This together with (6) prove the claim.
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Proof of Theorem 3.5. According to the above lemma, if we do not terminate Algorithm 2 in the first
iteration when an arc (i, gj) ∈ E \F with fij > ‖s(p, f)‖1 is found, then the potential φ(p, f) decreases
by a factor n4(m+ 1) within O(n6 log2 n) phases.
For a strongly polynomial algorithm, we also need to keep all intermediate numbers polynomial bit
length. For this, we can use the Duan-Mehlhorn [12] technique by restricting the prices and update
factor x to powers of (1+1/L) where L has polynomial bit length. This guarantees that all arithmetic
is performed on rational numbers of polynomial bit length. As shown in [12] this does not change the
number of iterations of the DM subroutine.
Remark 5.1. Compared to the original DM algorithm in [12], Algorithm 2 differs in the following.
1. We handle Event 1 (in line 10) differently than the other two events and this gives rise to two
nested loops, unlike [12] where every event is handled similarly and there is only one loop.
2. The edges in F are allowed to carry negative flow, unlike [12] where flow is always non-negative.
3. We initialize prices to p, unlike [12] where every price is initialized to 1. And, we stop when a
new edge is revealed.
6 A linear program for Ψ(F )
In this section, we first formulate an LP to compute Ψ(F ). Then, we introduce the class of Z+-
matrices, and formulate a general statement (Theorem 6.3) that shows how certain LPs with a Z+
constraint matrix can be approximated by a two variable per inequality system. We use this to prove
Theorem 3.4. The proof of Theorem 6.3 will be given in Section 7.
Given F ⊆ E, we consider the bipartite graph (A∪G,F ). Let C1, C2, . . . , Ct denote the connected
components that have a nonempty intersection with G. (In particular, we include all isolated vertices
in G, but not those in A.) Let γi := |Ci∩G|. Let us fix an arbitrary good in each of these components;
for simplicity of notation, let us assume that the fixed good in Ci is gi.
If all edges in F are forced to be MBB edges, then fixing the price pi of gi uniquely determines the
prices of all goods in Ci ∩ G. Indeed, for any buyer k ∈ Ci ∩ A, and any goods gℓ, gℓ′ ∈ Ci ∩ G with
kℓ, kℓ′ ∈ F , we have that pℓ/pℓ′ = ukℓ/ukℓ′ . Consequently, for any i ∈ [t], and for any gℓ ∈ Ci ∩G, we
can compute the multiplier θiℓ > 0 such that pℓ = θiℓpi whenever all edges in F are MBB. For an agent
ℓ ∈ A, let ρ(ℓ) ∈ [t] denote the index of the component containing the good gℓ of this agent: that is,
gℓ ∈ Cρ(ℓ) ∩G, and pℓ = θρ(ℓ)ℓpρ(ℓ). Let Θi :=
∑
gℓ∈Ci∩G
θiℓ; the total price of the goods in Ci is Θipi.
Example Throughout this and the next section, we illustrate the argument with
the example in Figure 1. There are 10 agents and 15 edges in F . The edges in F
are depicted by solid edges with the uij values indicated; all these are 1 except for
u17 = 2. The picture does not include the edges in E \ F except for one example:
the dashed line for (6, g8) with u68 = 3. There are 5 connected components,
containing goods {g1, g6}, {g2, g7, g8}, {g3, g9, g10}, {g4}, and {g5}, with p6 = p1,
p7 = p8 = 2p2, and p3 = p9 = p10. Thus, Θ1 = 2, Θ2 = 5, Θ3 = 3, Θ4 = 1,
Θ5 = 1, and γ1 = 2, γ2 = 3, γ3 = 3, γ4 = 1, γ5 = 1.
6.1 Constructing the LP
The variables (pi)i∈[t] uniquely determine the price of every good. We can formulate the problem of
computing Ψ(F ) in terms of these variables. To differentiate between this t-dimensional price vector
and the n-dimensional price vector of all goods, we say that for a price vector p¯ ∈ Rt, the vector p ∈ Rn
is the extension of p¯, if pℓ = θρ(ℓ)ℓp¯ρ(ℓ) for all ℓ ∈ [n] (in particular, pℓ = p¯ℓ for ℓ ∈ [t]). We also say
that the F -allocation (p, f) is an extension of p¯, if p is the extension of p¯.
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g1 g6 g2 g7 g8 g3 g9 g10 g4 g5
2 3 1 9 6 7 8 10 5 4
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13
Figure 1: Example problem setting.
We now formulate linear constraints that ensure that a vector p¯ ∈ Rt can be extended to an F -
allocation (p, f) with ‖s(p, f)‖∞ ≤ 1, and supp(f) ⊆ F . The first set of constraints will enforce that
all edges in F are MBB, and the second set will guarantee the existence of a desired money flow f
with the surplus bounds.
First, the edges in F are MBB if and only if ukj/pj ≤ ukj′/pj′ for any k ∈ A, and any gj , gj′ ∈
G such that (k, gj) ∈ E, (k, gj′) ∈ F . The θiℓ coefficients already capture that equality holds if
(k, gj), (k, gj′) ∈ F . For the rest of the pairs, we can express this constraint in terms of the p¯ variables
as
ukjθρ(j′)j′ p¯ρ(j′) − ukj′θρ(j)j p¯ρ(j) ≤ 0 ∀k, j, j
′ ∈ A, (k, gj) ∈ E \ F, (k, gj′) ∈ F. (7)
We add a second set of constraints for ‖s(p, f)‖∞ ≤ 1. Since f is supported on F and is allowed to
be negative, this can be guaranteed if and only if for any component Ci, i ∈ [t], the total price of the
goods in Ci ∩ G exceeds the total budget of the agents in Ci ∩ A by at most γi = |Ci ∩ G|. Recall
that given the prices p¯ of the fixed goods, the total price of goods in Ci ∩ G is Θip¯i. We obtain the
constraints
Θip¯i −
∑
k∈Ci∩A
θρ(k)kp¯ρ(k) ≤ γi ∀i ∈ [t]. (8)
Let us now define the following LP:
max
t∑
i=1
p¯i
s. t. constraint sets (7) and (8),
p¯ ≥ 0.
(PF )
Note that p¯ = 0 is a feasible solution. Using LP duality, the above program is unbounded if and only
if the next LP has a feasible solution p¯ 6= 0.
constraint set (7),
Θip¯i −
∑
k∈Ci∩A
θρ(k)kp¯ρ(k) ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ [t]
p¯ ≥ 0.
(P 0F )
Example Let us show the formulation for the example in Figure 1. The variables
are p¯1, p¯2, p¯3, p¯4, and p¯5. From the constraint set (7), we only show the example
of k = 6, j = 8, and j′ = 3:
3p¯3 − 2p¯2 ≤ 0.
For the components, we have
2p¯1 − p¯2 − p¯3 ≤ 2
5p¯2 − p¯1 − p¯3 ≤ 3
3p¯3 − p¯1 − 2p¯2 ≤ 3
p¯4 − 2p¯2 − p¯3 − p¯5 ≤ 1
p¯5 − p¯4 ≤ 1.
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Lemma 6.1. (i) Any solution p¯ ∈ Rn to (PF ) can be extended to an F -allocation (p, f) with
‖s(p, f)‖∞ ≤ 1, and supp(f) ⊆ F .
(ii) If (PF ) is bounded, then there exists a pointwise maximal solution p¯∗ ∈ Rt, that is, p¯ ≤ p¯∗ for
any solution p¯ ∈ Rt to (PF ). Let (p∗, f∗) denote the extension of these prices to an F -allocation
with ‖s(p∗, f∗)‖∞ ≤ 1, and supp(f
∗) ⊆ F . Then, Ψ(F ) = φ(p∗, f∗).
(iii) Under assumption (⋆), every nonzero solution to (P 0F ) is strictly positive. Such a solution can be
extended to an F -equilibrium.
Proof. The proof of part (i) was given above. For part (ii), let p¯ and p¯′ be two different solutions, and
let p¯′′i = max{p¯i, p¯
′
i} for all i ∈ [t]. Then it is easy to see that p¯
′′ satisfies all inequalities (7) and (8)1.
This implies the existence of a pointwise maximal p¯∗ in case (PF ) is bounded.
Let (p, f) be the optimal F -allocation such that Ψ(F ) = φ(p, f). Since φ(p, f) = φ(αp, αf) for any
α > 0, we may assume that ‖s(p, f)‖∞ = 1. Then, (pi)i∈[t] is feasible to (PF ), and therefore pi ≤ p
∗
i
for all i ∈ [t]. Consequently, φ(p∗, f∗) ≤ φ(p, f). Since φ(p∗, f∗) ≥ Ψ(F ), equality must hold, which in
particular implies p∗i = pi for all i ∈ [t].
Let us now turn to part (iii), when (P 0F ) has a nonzero solution p¯ ∈ R
t (and thus (PF ) is unbounded).
Let p ∈ Rn be the extension of p¯.
Summing up the second set of constraints in (P 0F ), the coefficient of every p¯i is nonnegative. Con-
sequently, all these inequalities must hold at equality, implying that in every component Ci, the total
budget of the agents in Ci ∩ A equals the total price of the goods in Ci ∩ G. Further, if i ∈ A has
no incident edges in F , then pi = 0 must hold. If p > 0, then the union of the components Ci equals
A ∪ G. Then, we can set f with supp(f) ⊆ F such that ‖s(p, f)‖1 = 0, and such a (p, f) gives an
F -equilibrium.
It is left to show that p¯ > 0, or equivalently, p > 0. Let A0 := {k ∈ A : pk = 0}, and assume
A0 6= ∅. By assumption (⋆), there exist k ∈ A \A0 and ℓ ∈ A0 such that ukℓ > 0. There exists at least
one edge (k, gj) ∈ F , as otherwise pk = 0, as shown above. By (7), j ∈ A0 must hold. Let Ci be the
component containing agent k and good gj . Clearly, for every gj′ ∈ Ci ∩ G, we have j′ ∈ A0. Hence,
the budget of every agent in Ci ∩A must also equal 0, in particular, pk = 0, a contradiction.
6.2 Monotone two variable per inequality systems
Let M2(m,n) denote the set of m× n rational matrices such that every matrix contains at most one
positive and at most one negative entry per row. For a matrix A ∈ M2(m,n), and an arbitrary vector
b ∈ Qm, the LP Ax ≤ b is called a monotone two variable per inequality system, abbreviated as M2VPI.
In every such system, whenever the objective function max
∑
i xi is bounded, there exists a pointwise
maximal feasible solution, that is, a feasible x∗ such that for every feasible solution x, x ≤ x∗.
This property holds more generally. Namely, a matrix is called pre-Leontief if every column contains
at most one positive element. If A⊤ is pre-Leontief, then the system A⊤x ≤ c has a pointwise
maximal feasible solution whenever max
∑
i xi is bounded [7]. Whereas M2VPI systems are strongly
polynomially solvable, as stated in the next theorem, no such algorithm is known for the general
pre-Leontief setting.
Theorem 6.1 ([1, 5, 26]). Consider an M2VPI system Ax ≤ b with A ∈ M2(m,n). Then there
exists a strongly polynomial O(mn logm+ mn2 log2 n) time algorithm that finds a feasible solution or
concludes infeasibility. Further, if there exists a pointwise maximal feasible solution, the algorithm also
finds that one.
Note that this theorem is not directly applicable to (PF ). Whereas the constraints (7) are of the
required form, the constraints (8) have only one positive coefficient but possibly multiple negative ones.
In what follows, we show that finding an approximate solution to (PF ) can be reduced to an M2VPI
system.
1This is true more generally for systems where the transposed of the constraint matrix is pre-Leontief, see Section 6.2.
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6.3 Z+-matrices
Let M ∈ Rt×t be the matrix representing the left hand side of the constraints in (8). That is, for all
i, j ∈ [t], we let
Mij :=
{
Θi −
∑
k∈Ci∩A:ρ(k)=i
θik, if i = j,
−
∑
k∈Ci∩A:ρ(k)=j
θjk, if i 6= j.
(9)
Thus, (8) can be written as Mp¯ ≤ γ, where γ⊤ = (γ1, . . . , γt).
Definition 6.2. A matrix M ∈ Qk×t is a Z+-matrix, if all off-diagonal entries are nonpositive,
2 and
all column sums are nonnegative. We let Z+(k, t) denote the set of k × t Z+-matrices.
Clearly, the matrix M defined by (9) is in Z+(t, t). Recall that a matrix is called a Z-matrix if all
off-diagonal entries are nonpositive; the notation reflects the additional requirement on the columns.
Further, note that a matrix is a Z+(t, t)-matrix if and only if it is the transposed of a weighted
Laplacian of a directed graph on t vertices, or if it can be obtained by deleting a row and a column
of the transposed of a weighted Laplacian of a directed graph on t + 1 vertices. We will prove the
following theorem on LPs with Z+-matrices as constraint matrices.
Theorem 6.3. Given a matrix M ∈ Z+(k, t) with ℓ nonzero entries, and b ∈ Q
k, with b > 0, we let
PM = {x ∈ R
t : Mx ≤ b, x ≥ 0}.
Then, in time O(ℓt3), we can construct a matrix M¯ ∈ M2(ℓ
′, t) and b¯ ∈ Ql
′
for ℓ′ ≤ ℓ such that
PM ⊆ {x ∈ R
t : M¯x ≤ b¯, x ≥ 0} ⊆ B2PM ,
where B =
∑k
j=1 bj/mini∈[k] bi. Further, the size of the entries in M¯ and b¯ will be polynomially bounded
in the encoding size of the input.
Here, we use the notation αP = {αx : x ∈ P} for a set P and a constant α > 0. The proof of
Theorem 6.3 will be given in Section 7; we now use it to derive Theorem 3.4.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Lemma 6.1 establishes that computing Ψ(F ) is equivalent to solving the LP
(PF ). We construct a second LP QF as follows. For the constraint set (8) in the form Mp¯ ≤ γ, we
apply Theorem 6.3 to obtain M¯p¯ ≤ γ¯. Note that B ≤ n, since
∑t
i=1 γi = n, and γi ≥ 1 for i ∈ [t].
Then, we let
QF := {p¯ ∈ R
t : p¯ satisfies (7) and M¯p¯ ≤ γ¯}.
Let PF denote the feasible region of (PF ). Using that all right hand sides in (7) are 0, we see that
PF ⊆ QF ⊆ n
2PF .
Since QF is an M2VPI system, Theorem 6.1 provides a strongly polynomial algorithm to obtain the
prices p¯ maximizing
∑t
i=1 p¯i over QF , or concludes that this objective is unbounded on QF . In case a
finite optimum exists, p¯/n2 is feasible to (PF ) and is within a factor n2 from an optimal solution.
If the objective is unbounded on QF , then we claim that we can get a nonzero solution to (P 0F ).
Using LP duality, the objective is unbounded on QF if and only if there is a feasible solution p¯ 6= 0 to
Q0F = {p¯ ∈ R
t : p¯ satisfies (7) and M¯p¯ ≤ 0}.
Again, Theorem 6.1 is applicable to find a nonzero solution q. Suppose q 6= 0 is a solution to Q0F . This
implies that αq is a feasible solution to QF for all α ≥ 0. Since for every feasible solution p¯ to QF ,
p¯/n2 is a feasible solution to (PF ), this further implies that αq is also a feasible solution to (PF ) for
all α ≥ 0. Therefore, q must be a solution to (P 0F ).
The number of nonzero entries in M is ≤ 2n. Thus, constructing M¯ and γ¯ takes O(n4) time. We
obtain an M2VPI system with ≤ m + 2n constraints and ≤ n variables, and m = O(n2), thus the
running time for solving the M2VPI system is O(n4 log2 n) that dominates the total running time.
2For a non-square matrix, by diagonal entries we mean all entries zii for 1 ≤ i ≤ min{k, t}.
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Finally, for a strongly polynomial algorithm we also have to provide polynomial bounds on the
encoding lengths of the numbers during the algorithm. The entries of M are simple expressions of the
input parameters uij . Then, Theorem 6.3 guarantees that M¯ and vector γ¯ also have bounded encoding
length. Thus, the strongly polynomial M2VPI algorithm takes a polynomial size input and therefore
the overall algorithm will be strongly polynomial.
7 Approximating systems with Z+-matrices
This section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 6.3. For consistency with the market terminology,
we use p¯ ∈ Rt as the variables. Recall that we need to show that given a system PM = {p¯ ∈ Rt :
Mp¯ ≤ γ, p¯ ≥ 0} with M ∈ Z+(k, t) with ℓ nonzero entries and γ ∈ Qk, γ > 0, we can construct a
matrix M¯ ∈ M2(ℓ′, t) and γ¯ ∈ Ql
′
for ℓ′ ≤ ℓ in O(ℓt3) time such that PM ⊆ {p¯ ∈ Rt : M¯p¯ ≤ γ¯, p¯ ≥
0} ⊆ B2PM , where B =
∑k
j=1 γj/mini∈[k] γi.
Let Mi ∈ Rt denote the i-th row of the matrix M for i ∈ [t]. We will assume that k = t, that is,
M is a square matrix. Indeed, if k > t, then the last k − t rows only contain nonpositive coefficients.
Therefore, for i > t, Mip¯ ≤ 0 holds for every p¯ ≥ 0. If t > k, then by the Z+-property, all entries
of the last t− k columns must be 0, and thus, we can delete these columns. We further assume that
all diagonal entries are strictly positive; if Mii = 0 then we can remove the i-th row and i-th column
similarly.
Let us also note that every matrix in Z+(t, t) can be obtained in the form (9), corresponding to a
market problem with t components. We start by showing a lower bound on Mp¯.
Lower bounding the vector Mp¯ For i ∈ [t], we let λi :=
∑
j 6=i γj, and we let λ := (λ1, . . . , λt)
⊤.
Lemma 7.1. Let M ∈ Z+(t, t). Assume that p¯ ∈ R
t
+ satisfies Mp¯ ≤ γ. Then, we also have
Mp¯ ≥ −λ ≥ −(B − 1)γ.
Proof. The sum of the rows is
∑
j∈[t]Mj ≥ 0 since M is a Z+-matrix. Therefore, for any i ∈ [t], we
have
Mip¯ =

∑
j∈[t]
Mj

 p¯−

 ∑
j∈[t],j 6=i
Mj

 p¯ ≥ − ∑
j∈[t],j 6=i
γj = −λi.
The inequality λ ≤ (B − 1)γ follows by the definition of B.
7.1 Gaussian elimination for Z+-matrices
We will use Gaussian elimination to generate new constraints. For this purpose, we show that Gaussian
elimination on Z+-matrices will only add nonnegative multiples of rows to other rows.
Lemma 7.2. Let T ∈ Z+(ℓ, t). Then, using Gaussian elimination, we can obtain a matrix T
′ = Y T ,
where T ′ ∈ Rℓ×t is an upper triangular matrix with diagonal entries 0 or 1, and all off-diagonal
entries are nonpositive; further, all entries of Y ∈ Rℓ×ℓ are nonnegative. If Tik < 0 for some k ∈ [t],
i ∈ [k + 1, ℓ], then T ′kk = 1.
Proof. Let T (k) = Y (k)T be the matrix after k steps in the Gaussian elimination with T (0) = T and
Y (0) = Iℓ. By induction on k, we simultaneously show the following:
• Y (k) is a nonnegative matrix;
•
∑ℓ
i=k+1 T
(k)
ij ≥ 0 for j ∈ [k + 1, t];
• T
(k)
ij ≤ 0 for i 6= j;
• T
(k)
ii ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [k].
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Note that the last three properties imply that the lower right (ℓ− k) × (t− k) submatrix of T (k) is a
Z+-matrix.
The properties clearly hold for k = 0; assume we have proved these for k − 1. Consider the k-th
iteration. If T (k−1)kk = 0, then no row operation is performed. In this case, we set T
(k) := T (k−1) and
Y (k) := Y (k−1). We only need to verify that
∑ℓ
i=k+1 T
(k)
ij ≥ 0 for j ∈ [k + 1, t]. This follows from the
induction hypotheses:
∑ℓ
i=k T
(k−1)
ij ≥ 0, and T
(k−1)
kj ≤ 0 for j ∈ [k + 1, t].
If T (k−1)kk > 0, then we multiply the k-th row by 1/T
(k−1)
kk , and add −T
(k−1)
ik /T
(k−1)
kk times the k-th
row to the i-th row for all i ∈ [k+1, ℓ]. By induction, these coefficients are all nonnegative. We update
the transformation matrix Y (k) accordingly, and thus it remains a nonnegative matrix. Consider now
the j-th column of T (k) for j ∈ [k + 1, t]. We have
ℓ∑
i=k+1
T
(k)
ij =
ℓ∑
i=k+1
T
(k−1)
ij − T
(k−1)
kj
ℓ∑
i=k+1
T
(k−1)
ik /T
(k−1)
kk . (10)
The second induction hypothesis for j = k gives T (k−1)kk +
∑ℓ
i=k+1 T
(k−1)
ik ≥ 0. Rearranging, and using
that T (k−1)kk > 0, we obtain −
∑ℓ
i=k+1 T
(k−1)
ik /T
(k−1)
kk ≤ 1. If we multiply this by T
(k−1)
kj ≤ 0, we get
−T
(k−1)
kj
ℓ∑
i=k+1
T
(k−1)
ik /T
(k−1)
kk ≥ T
(k−1)
kj .
Substituting into (10), this yields
ℓ∑
i=k+1
T
(k)
ij ≥
ℓ∑
i=k+1
T
(k−1)
ij + T
(k−1)
kj ≥ 0,
again by the induction hypothesis.
For the last part, let Tik < 0 for k ∈ [t], i ∈ [k + 1, ℓ]. Note that T
(k−1)
ik ≤ T
(k−2)
ik ≤ . . . ≤ T
(0)
ik < 0.
The induction hypothesis gives
∑ℓ
j=k T
(k−1)
jk ≥ 0, and therefore T
(k−1)
kk > 0. We set T
(k)
kk = 1, and this
entry does not change in any later steps of the algorithm.
7.2 Constructing the approximate system
Let us now describe the construction of the M2VPI system M¯p ≤ γ¯ as in Theorem 6.3. We define
a digraph ([t],H) by adding an arc ij ∈ H if Mij < 0. For each i ∈ [t], we let Di ⊆ [t] be the set
of vertices reachable from i in the digraph ([t],H), and let di := |Di|. We let M (i) denote the di × t
submatrix of M comprising the rows Mj for j ∈ Di. We partition [t] into three groups:
T1 := {i ∈ [t] : |{j : ij ∈ H}| ≤ 1},
T2 := {i ∈ [t] \ T1 : rk(M
(i)) = di}, T3 := {i ∈ [t] \ T1 : rk(M
(i)) < di}.
If i ∈ T1, then Mi has at most one positive and at most one negative entry; thus, we can keep the
constraint Mip¯ ≤ γi unchanged. For i ∈ T2 ∪ T3, for every outgoing arc ij ∈ H, we shall define a
constraint in the form v(ij)
⊤
p¯ ≥ δ(ij). Further, for every i ∈ T2, we shall add an additional constraint
p¯i ≤ κi.
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Example The picture shows the
graph ([t],H) for the system obtained
from Figure 1. We have D1 = D2 =
D3 = {1, 2, 3}, and D4 = D5 =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Now,
M (1) =

 2 −1 −1 0 0−1 5 −1 0 0
−1 −2 3 0 0

 ,
M (4) =


2 −1 −1 0 0
−1 5 −1 0 0
−1 −2 3 0 0
0 −2 −1 1 −1
0 0 0 −1 1

 ,
andM (2) = M (3) = M (1),M (5) = M (4).
We get T1 = {5}, T2 = {1, 2, 3}, and
T3 = {4}.
1
2
4
3
5
The construction is somewhat technical, even though the underlying idea is relatively simple. For
each ij ∈ H, we wish to obtain the constraint v(ij)
⊤
p¯ ≥ δ(ij) such that p¯j has a positive coefficient,
p¯i has a nonpositive coefficient, and all other coefficients are 0. We wish to derive a valid constraint
for (PF ) by taking a nonnegative combination of constraints from Mp¯ ≥ −λ; recall from Lemma 7.1
that these are valid for (PF ). Lemma 7.2 shows that when we apply Gaussian elimination to a Z+-
matrix, then we only add rows with nonnegative coefficients. Hence, if we apply Gaussian elimination
to the matrix M , and apply the same operations to the right hand side −λ, then we can derive valid
constraints from Mp¯ ≥ −λ. In the construction that follows, we apply a permutation to a submatrix
of M where in the penultimate step of Gaussian elimination produces a constraint of the desired form.
Let i ∈ T2 ∪ T3, and d := di. For every ij ∈ H, let us define a permutation σ(ij) of the set [t] as
follows. We set σ(d− 1) = j, σ(d) = i, and fill the first d− 2 positions with the elements of Di \ {i, j}
in such a way that for any ℓ ∈ Di \ {i}, there is an edge ℓ′ℓ ∈ H such that σ(ℓ) < σ(ℓ′) ≤ d. The
final t − d positions contain the elements of [t] \ Di in an arbitrary order. Let M (ij) ∈ Rd×t denote
the matrix obtained from M (i) by applying the permutation σ(ij) to the rows and the columns, and
deleting the last t− d rows. It is easy to see that M (ij) is a Z+-matrix.
Let us apply Gaussian elimination as in Lemma 7.2 to M (ij) to obtain an upper triangular matrix
N (ij) = Y (ij)M (ij). Let γ(ij), λ(ij) ∈ Rd be the vectors obtained by permuting the components of γ
and λ with σ(ij), and removing the last t− d entries.
Let us set v(ij) to be the (d − 1)-st row N (ij)d−1 with the inverse of the permutation σ
(ij) applied to
its elements. (So that its i-th coordinate corresponds to p¯i). Let
δ(ij) := −Y
(ij)
d−1λ
(ij). (11)
For i ∈ T2, we add an additional constraint p¯i ≤ κ(i). Let us pick an arbitrary ij ∈ H, and let
κ(i) := Y
(ij)
d γ
(ij). (12)
It will be shown in Lemma 7.3 that this value is independent of the choice of the arc ij. The LP
M¯ p¯ ≤ γ¯ will be the following system:
Mip¯ ≤ γi ∀i ∈ T1,
p¯i ≤ κ
(i) ∀i ∈ T2,
v(ij)
⊤
p¯ ≥ δ(ij) ∀ij ∈ H, i ∈ T2 ∪ T3,
p¯ ≥ 0.
(13)
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Example Continuing with the example, we have γ⊤ = (2, 3, 3, 1, 1), and λ⊤ =
(8, 7, 7, 9, 9). Let us consider i = 1, j = 2. We use the permutation σ(12) = (32145),
yielding
M (12) =

 3 −2 −1 0 0−1 5 −1 0 0
−1 −1 2 0 0

 , γ(12) =

33
2

 , λ(12) =

77
8

 ,
From Gaussian elimination, we get
N (12) =


1 −23 −
1
3 0 0
0 1 − 413 0 0
0 0 1 0 0

 , Y (12)γ(12) =


1
12
13
59
15

 , Y (12)λ(12) =


7
3
28
13
181
15

 .
This yields the constraint v(12)
⊤
p¯ ≥ δ(12) for v(12)
⊤
=
(
− 413 , 1, 0, 0,
)
, and δ(12) =
−2813 , that is,
−
4
13
p¯1 + p¯2 ≥ −
28
13
.
Further, we can also use this to obtain p¯1 ≤ κ(1) for κ(1) = 5915 , that is,
p¯1 ≤
59
15
.
The system QF comprises the constraint set (7), and the following constraints:
p¯2 −
4
13
p¯1 ≥ −
28
13
, p¯1 ≤
59
15
, (i = 1, j = 2) p¯2 ≥ −
88
15
, (i = 4, j = 2)
p¯1 − p¯2 ≥ −
31
5
, p¯2 ≤
32
15
, (i = 2, j = 1) p¯3 ≥ −
154
15
, (i = 4, j = 3)
p¯3 −
7
13
p¯1 ≥ −
49
13
, (i = 1, j = 3) p¯5 − p¯4 ≥ −9, (i = 4, j = 5)
p¯1 −
2
3
p¯3 ≥ −
47
9
, p¯3 ≤
61
12
, (i = 3, j = 1) p¯4 − p¯5 ≥ −31. (i = 5, j = 4)
p¯3 − p¯2 ≥ −
22
5
, (i = 2, j = 3)
p¯2 −
1
3
p¯3 ≥ −
22
9
, (i = 3, j = 2) .
7.3 Proof of correctness
We need one more claim before proving Theorem 6.3.
Claim 7.1. Let i ∈ [t] and let d := di.
(i) For any ij ∈ H, N
(ij)
kk = 1 for all k ∈ [d− 1], and N
(ij)
kℓ = 0 for all k ∈ [d], ℓ ∈ [d+ 1, t].
(ii) If i ∈ T2, then N
(ij)
dd = 1, and if i ∈ T3, then N
(ij)
dd = 0.
(iii) If i ∈ T3, then Mi can be written as a linear combination of the vectors {Mh : h ∈ Di \ {i}}.
Proof. (i) In the definition of the permutation σ(ij) it was required that for any k ∈ [d − 1], there is
an entry M (ij)ℓk < 0 for some ℓ with σ(k) < σ(ℓ) ≤ d. The last part of Lemma 7.2 guarantees that
N
(ij)
kk = 1 for all k ∈ [d − 1]. Further, we note that according to the definition of the set Di, we have
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M
(ij)
kℓ = 0 for all k ∈ [d], ℓ ∈ [d + 1, t]. Thus, the last t − d entries of every row in M
(ij) are 0’s and
therefore also in N (ij).
(ii) Together with the fact the N (ij) is an upper triangular matrix, we see that the only nonzero entry of
the d-th row N (ij)d is the diagonal entry N
(ij)
dd ∈ {0, 1}. Also note that rk(N
(ij)) = rk(M (ij)) = rk(M (i)).
If i ∈ T2, then we must have rk(N (ij)) = d, and therefore N
(ij)
dd = 1, as otherwise N
(ij)
d = 0. On the
other hand, if i ∈ T3, then N
(ij)
dd = 0, as otherwise N
(ij) would be an upper triangular matrix with the
first d diagonal entries equal to one, contradicting rk(N (ij)) < d.
(iii) We claim that rk(Mh : h ∈ Di \ {i}) = d− 1. This implies the statement, since we assumed that
rk(M (i)) = rk(Mh : h ∈ Di) = d − 1. Note that the first d − 1 rows of M (ij) are permutations of the
vectors Mh for h ∈ Di \ {i}, and hence have the same rank. The rank is preserved during Gaussian
elimination. Therefore,
rk(Mh : h ∈ Di \ {i}) = rk(M
(ij)
h : h ∈ [d− 1]) = rk(N
(ij)
h : h ∈ [d− 1]) = d− 1.
The last equality follows since N (ij) is an upper triangular matrix with the first d− 1 diagonal entries
being 1.
Proof of Theorem 6.3. Form of the constraints. First, let us show that the system M¯p¯ ≤ γ¯ given
in (13) is an M2VPI system. This is clearly true for the constraints for i ∈ T1 and for i ∈ T2. Consider
now the constraints v(ij)
⊤
p¯ ≥ δ(ij). The vector v(ij) was obtained as the appropriate permutation of
the (d − 1)-st row of the matrix N (ij). According to Claim 7.1, this row may contain nonzero entries
only in positions d − 1 and d. Further, v(ij)j = N
(ij)
(d−1)(d−1) = 1, and v
(ij)
i = N
(ij)
(d−1)d ≤ 0 as it is an
off-diagonal entry.
Encoding length. We need to show that the encoding size of M¯ and b¯ are polynomially bounded
in the encoding size of M and b. This easily follows since the constraints are obtained by Gaussian
elimination; we refer to [14] for strong polynomiality of Gaussian elimination.
Containment of PM . We show that every p¯ satisfying Mp¯ ≤ γ is also feasible to (13). For i ∈ T1,
the constraint Mip¯ ≤ γi is identical to the i-th constraint in PM .
For i ∈ T2, let ij ∈ H be the edge used in the definition of κ(i). According to Claim 7.1, the row
N
(ij)
d has a single nonzero entry N
(ij)
dd = 1. Lemma 7.2 guarantees that the coefficient matrix Y
(ij) is
nonnegative. Therefore, the constraint p¯i ≤ κ(i) can be obtained as a nonnegative combination of the
constraint set Mp¯ ≤ γ, by multiplying Mhp¯ ≤ γh for h ∈ Di by Y
(ij)
dσ(ij)(h)
.
The validity of the constraints v(ij)
⊤
p¯ ≥ δ(ij) follows similarly. Recall from Lemma 7.1 that
Mp¯ ≥ −λ is valid for p¯. The constraint v(ij)
⊤
p¯ ≥ δ(ij) is obtained by taking a nonnegative combination
of the inequalities Mp¯ ≥ −λ combining Mhp¯ ≥ −λh for h ∈ Di with the nonnegative coefficient
Y
(ij)
(d−1)σ(ij)(h)
. Hence, all these inequalities are valid for p¯.
Approximate reverse containment. We next show that if p¯ is feasible to (13), then p¯ is feasible to
B2PM , that is, Mp¯ ≤ B2γ. Clearly, for i ∈ T1, Mip¯ ≤ γi ≤ B2γi. The more difficult part is to show
the validity of Mip¯ ≤ B2γi for i ∈ T2 ∪ T3.
For i ∈ T3, we show that the constraints
v(ij)
⊤
p¯ ≥ δ(ij) ∀j : ij ∈ H
together imply Mip¯ ≤ B2γi. For i ∈ T2, we will also make use of the additional constraint p¯i ≤ κ(i) to
derive Mip¯ ≤ B2γi. The following technical lemma will be needed.
Lemma 7.3. Consider any i ∈ T2 ∪ T3.
(i) There is a unique vector q(i) ∈ Rt+ such that Mℓq
(i) = 0 for all ℓ ∈ Di \ {i}, q
(i)
i = 1, and q
(i)
ℓ = 0
for ℓ ∈ [t] \Di.
(ii) For any ij ∈ H, v
(ij)
j = 1 and v
(ij)
i = −q
(i)
j .
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(iii) If i ∈ T2, then there exists a vector r
(i) ∈ Rt+ with Mr
(i) ≤ γ, Mℓr
(i) = γℓ for all ℓ ∈ Di, and
r
(i)
i = κ
(i).
(iv) If i ∈ T3, then there exists a vector r
(i) ∈ Rt+ with Mr
(i) ≤ γ, and Mℓr
(i) = γℓ for all ℓ ∈ Di \{i}.
Proof. For part (i), let us apply Gaussian elimination as in Lemma 7.2 to the matrix M (ij) for any
ij ∈ H. Note that M (ij)ℓ qˆ = 0 for ℓ ∈ [d−1] is equivalent to Mℓq = 0 for all ℓ ∈ Di \{i}, where qˆ is the
vector obtained from q by permuting the elements by σ(ij). The system of linear equations M (ij)ℓ qˆ = 0
for ℓ ∈ [d− 1] is turned into the system N (ij)ℓ qˆ = 0 for ℓ ∈ [d− 1] using the elimination.
From Claim 7.1, we have that N (ij)kk = 1 for all k ∈ [d − 1], and all off-diagonal elements of the
upper triangular matrix N (ij) are nonpositive. Hence, if we set qˆk = 0 for all k ∈ [d+ 1, t] and qˆd = 1,
then the system N (ij)ℓ qˆ = 0 for ℓ ∈ [d− 1] has a unique nonnegative solution. Applying the inverse of
σ(ij) to qˆ we obtain the desired vector q(i).
For part (ii), recall that v(ij)i is obtained from N
(ij)
d−1 using the inverse of the permutation σ
(ij).
We have already verified that the only possible nonzero entries in N (ij)d−1 are the (d − 1)-st and d-th
components, and that v(ij)j = N
(ij)
(d−1)(d−1) = 1. Since N
(ij)
d−1qˆ = 0, and qˆd = q
(i)
i = 1, we must have
qˆd−1 +N
(ij)
(d−1)d = 0, and thus N
(ij)
(d−1)d = −qˆd−1; after permuting, this gives v
(ij)
i = −q
(i)
j .
Let us now turn to part (iii). Let i ∈ T2, and let us fix an arbitrary ij ∈ H. The system Mℓr = γℓ
for all ℓ ∈ Di is equivalent to M (ij)rˆ = γ(ij), where rˆ is obtained from r by the permutation σ(ij).
After Gaussian elimination, we obtain the equivalent system
N (ij)rˆ = Y (ij)γ(ij).
According to Claim 7.1, N (ij)ℓℓ = 1 for all ℓ ∈ [d]. This system has a unique solution rˆ with rˆℓ = 0
for d + 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ t; note also that rˆd = Y
(ij)
d γ
(ij) = κ(i). Since the right hand side is nonnegative, and
N (ij) is an upper triangular matrix with all off-diagonal entries being nonpositive, we see that rˆℓ ≥ 0
for all ℓ ∈ [d]. Let r(i) be the vector obtained from rˆ by applying the inverse permutation of σ(ij). It
remains to show that Mℓr(i) ≤ γℓ holds for all ℓ ∈ [t] \Di. The only positive coefficient in Mℓ can be
Mℓℓ. However, since r
(i)
ℓ = 0, it follows that Mℓr
(i) ≤ 0 for these values of ℓ.
The proof of part (iv) is similar. Let i ∈ T3, and let us fix an arbitrary ij ∈ H. The system
Mℓr = γℓ for all ℓ ∈ Di \ {i} is equivalent to M
(ij)
ℓ rˆ = γ
(ij)
ℓ for ℓ ∈ [d − 1], where rˆ is obtained by
applying the permutation σ(ij) to the vector r. After Gaussian elimination, we obtain the equivalent
system
N
(ij)
ℓ rˆ = Y
(ij)
ℓ γ
(ij) ∀ℓ ∈ [d− 1],
with N (ij)ℓℓ = 1 for all ℓ ∈ [d− 1]. As in part (iii), we see that there is a unique solution with rˆℓ = 0 for
d ≤ ℓ ≤ t, and this solution satisfies rˆℓ ≥ 0 for all ℓ ∈ [d − 1]. We obtain r(i) by applying the inverse
of σ(ij) to rˆ. It follows as above that Mℓr(i) ≤ 0 for all ℓ ∈ [t] \ Di. The same argument also gives
Mir
(i) ≤ 0, since r(i)i = 0. Hence, Mr
(i) ≤ γ holds.
Assume now that i ∈ T2 ∪ T3. We will show that Mip¯ ≤ B2γi. Let q := q(i) as in Lemma 7.3(i).
By part (ii) of the same lemma, and substituting the definition (11) of δ(ij), the constraints can be
written as
p¯j − qj p¯i ≥ −Y
(ij)
d−1λ
(ij) ∀j : ij ∈ H.
Note that λ(ij)ℓ ≤ (B − 1)γ
(ij)
ℓ for all ℓ ∈ [d] by the definition of B, and Y
(ij)
d−1 ≥ 0. Therefore, these
constraints imply
p¯j − qj p¯i ≥ −(B − 1)Y
(ij)
d−1γ
(ij) ∀j : ij ∈ H.
Recall that Mij < 0 if and only if ij ∈ H. Let us multiply the inequality for every j 6= i by Mij ≤ 0,
and add up these inequalities. We obtain
∑
j:ij∈H
Mij p¯j −

 ∑
j:ij∈H
Mijqj

 p¯i ≤ −(B − 1) ∑
j:ij∈H
MijY
(ij)
d−1γ
(ij). (14)
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For the rest of the proof, we distinguish the cases i ∈ T3 and i ∈ T2.
Case i ∈ T3. Since Mhq = 0 for all h ∈ Di \ {i}, Claim 7.1(iii) implies Miq = 0. Substituting qi = 1,
we see that Mii = −
∑
j:ij∈HMijqj. With ηi := −
∑
j:ij∈HMijY
(ij)
d−1γ
(ij), (14) can be written as
Miip¯i +
∑
j:ij∈H
Mij p¯j ≤ (B − 1)ηi. (15)
The left hand side is Mip¯. We next show ηi ≤ λi, which together with λi ≤ (B − 1)γi yields Mip¯ ≤
(B − 1)2γi.
To see ηi ≤ λi, we make use of the vector r = r(i) as in Lemma 7.3(iv). Let rˆ denote the permutation
σ(ij) applied to r. Since M (ij)ℓ rˆ = γℓ is valid for all ℓ ∈ [d − 1], we have N
(ij)
d−1rˆ = Y
(ij)
d−1γ
(ij). This can
be written as
rj − qjri = Y
(ij)
d−1γ
(ij).
Summing up these equalities after multiplying the j-th one by Mij < 0, we see as above that
Mir = −ηi.
Since Mr ≤ γ, from Lemma 7.1 we have −ηi = Mir ≥ −λi, and therefore ηi ≤ λi as needed.
Case i ∈ T2. The coefficient of p¯i in (14) equals Mii−Miq. In contrast with the previous case, Miq is
not necessarily 0. We claim that Miq ≥ 0. To see this, note that
∑
h∈Di
Mhq ≥ 0 since
∑
h∈Di
Mh ≥ 0
from the Z+-property and q ≥ 0; further, Mhq = 0 for h ∈ Di \ {i}. Let us further add to (14) Miq
times the inequality p¯i ≤ κ(i). Thus, we obtain
Mip¯ ≤ (B − 1)ηi + κ
(i)Miq. (16)
Let r = r(i) as in Lemma (7.3)(iii). As for i ∈ T3, we must have
rj − qjri = Y
(ij)
d−1γ
(ij) ∀ij ∈ H.
Adding up these equations multiplied by Mij , and further adding Miq times the equality ri = κ(i), we
obtain
Mir = −ηi + κ
(i)Miq.
On the other hand, we know that Mir = γi. Thus, γi = −ηi + κ(i)Miq. Consequently, from (16) we
obtain
Mip¯ ≤ Bκ
(i)Miq. (17)
The next claim completes the proof of Mip¯ ≤ B2γi.
Claim 7.2. κ(i)Miq ≤ Bγi.
Proof. For ij ∈ H used in defining κ(i), let qˆ be the vector obtained from q by applying the permutation
σ(ij). We first show that Miq = 1/Y
(ij)
dd . To see this, first note that N
(ij)
d qˆ = 1, since N
(ij)
dd = 1, qˆd = 1,
and all other entries are 0. We have
1 = N
(ij)
d qˆ = Y
(ij)
d (M
(ij)qˆ) = Y
(ij)
dd (M
(ij)
d qˆ) = Y
(ij)
dd (Miq)
The third equality follows since M (ij)ℓ qˆ = 0 for ℓ ∈ [d − 1]. Using the definition (12) of κ
(i), we have
that
κ(i)Miq =
d∑
h=1
Y
(ij)
dh
Y
(ij)
dd
γ
(ij)
h . (18)
Let us now show that Y (ij)dh ≤ Y
(ij)
dd for all h ∈ [d]. Let us pick h such that it maximizes Y
(ij)
dh over
h ∈ [d], and select the largest h where the maximum is taken. For a contradiction, assume that h < d.
Since N (ij) is an upper triangular matrix, we have
0 = N
(ij)
dh =
d∑
ℓ=1
Y
(ij)
dℓ M
(ij)
ℓh .
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Using that M (ij) is a Z+-matrix, we have M
(ij)
hh ≥ 0, M
(ij)
ℓh ≤ 0 for ℓ 6= h, and
∑d
ℓ=1M
(ij)
ℓh ≥ 0.
Using the maximality of Y (ij)dh , we see that equality can only hold if
∑d
ℓ=1M
(ij)
ℓh = 0, and Y
(ij)
dℓ = Y
(ij)
dh
whenever M (ij)ℓh < 0. This contradicts the maximal choice of h, since the permutation σ
(ij) was chosen
so that there exists an ℓ > h with M (ij)ℓh < 0 whenever h < d. Thus, we can conclude that Y
(ij)
dh ≤ Y
(ij)
dd
for all h ∈ [d]. From (18), it follows that
κ(i)Miq ≤
d∑
h=1
γ
(ij)
h =
∑
h∈Di
γh ≤ Bγi,
using the definition of B.
This proves the theorem.
8 Conclusions
We have given a strongly polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium in linear exchange mar-
kets. We use the Duan-Mehlhorn algorithm as a subroutine in a framework that repeatedly identifies
revealed arcs. Before each iteration of this subroutine, we use another method to find a good starting
solution for the current set of revealed arcs. The best solution here corresponds to the optimal solution
of a linear program. Whereas no strongly polynomial algorithm is known for an LP of this form, we
presented a strongly polynomial approximation by constructing a second LP.
It could be worth exploring whether this approach extends further. An immediate question is to
see if one can use such an approach to obtain a ε-approximation of the LP in strongly polynomial
time for every ε > 0. Further, such a method could be potentially useful for a broader class of LPs; a
natural candidate would be systems of the form A⊤x ≤ c for a pre-Leontief matrix A [7], a class where
a pointwise maximal solution exists, but no strongly polynomial algorithm is known.
Our approach was specific to the market equilibrium problem. The method of identifying revealed
arc sets originates from [39]. This result was applicable not only for the linear Fisher market model,
but more generally, for minimum-cost flow problems with separable convex objectives satisfying certain
assumptions. It would be desirable to extend the current approach to a broader class of convex programs
that include the formulation in [8].
Acknowledgements. The first author is grateful to Kurt Mehlhorn and Richard Cole for many
interesting discussions on this problem.
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A Appendix
A.1 Balanced flows
Given an F -allocation and prices such that F ⊆ MBB(p), we define a capacitated directed graph
N(p, F ), called the flow network. The network has vertices A ∪ G ∪ {s, t}, where s is a source node
and t is a sink node, and the following set of edges: (s, i) with capacity pi for each i ∈ A, (gj , t) with
capacity pj for each gj ∈ G, (i, gj) with infinite capacity for each MBB edge (i, gj), and the reverse
edges (gj , i) with infinite capacity for each edge (i, gj) ∈ F . It was shown in [9, 12] how a balanced
flow can be computed in a flow network, similar to N(p, F ) but without the reverse edges, with at
most n max-flow computations. We show that their algorithm easily extends to N(p, F ).
Lemma 3.3. Given F ⊆ E and prices p such that F ⊆ MBB(p), a balanced F -flow can be computed
in O(n2m) time.
Proof. We use the divide and conquer method as in [9, 12]. First, compute a maximum flow f in
N(p, F ). If f saturates all edges out of s, then there is no surplus with respect to f , and hence f is
balanced. Otherwise, let cavg =
∑
i∈A ci(p, f)/n be the average surplus of the agents. Next, consider
a residual network Gf with respect to f , and give every agent i a supply/demand of ci(p, f) − cavg .
We compute a maximum flow g in the modified residual network. If all supplies can be routed, there
is a balanced flow f + g, in which all agents have surplus equal to cavg . Otherwise, let (S, T ) be the
maximal min-cut in that network where s ∈ S, t ∈ T . Observe that no edge in F can participate in
the min-cut. Let N1 and N2 be the networks induced by T ∪ {s} and S ∪ {t} respectively. It is shown
in [9] that the union of balanced flows in N1 and N2 is a balanced flow in N . So we recurse on N1 and
N2, and continue. This implies that we need at most n max-flow computations to find a balanced flow
in N(p, F ). The running time bound is obtained using Orlin’s max flow algorithm [31].
Remark A.1. While computing a balanced flow f ′ from a given flow f , [11, 12] also need that if the
surplus of a good w.r.t. f is zero, then it remains zero w.r.t. f ′. This is used to upper bound the value
of prices. Since our stopping criteria is finding a new revealed edge, we do not need to maintain this
property.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 5.4
We will use the following simple lemmas to prove the result.
Lemma A.1 ([11]). Let r = (r1, . . . , rn) and r′ = (r′1, . . . , r
′
n) be nonnegative vectors. Let k ∈ [1, n] be
such that r′i ≥ r
′
j for i ≤ k < j. Suppose that δi = ri − r
′
i ≥ 0 for i ≤ k and δj = r
′
j − rj ≥ 0 for j > k.
Let D = mini≤k ri −maxj>k rj, and let ∆ =
∑
i≤k δi. If ∆ ≥
∑
j>k δj,
‖r′‖2
2
≤ ‖r‖2
2
−D∆ .
Lemma A.2 ([11, 12]). Given n numbers a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an ≥ 0. Let l be minimal such that
al/al+1 ≤ 1 + 1/n. Let l = n if there is no such l. Then (e · n)al ≥ ‖a‖1 and ai ≤ e · al,∀i.
The proof of the following lemma is an adaptation of the proof given in [11].
Lemma 5.4. Let f be a balanced flow in N(p, F ) at the beginning of a phase, and let (p′, f ′) be the
prices and flow at the end of the phase. Then
(i)
∏n
j=1 p
′
j ≥
(
1 + 1
Cn3
)∏n
j=1 pj in a price-rise phase, and
(ii) ‖c(p′, f ′)‖2 ≤ ‖c(p, f)‖2/
(
1 + 1
Cn3
)
in a balancing phase,
where C = 56e2.
26
Proof. Let xmax = 1 + 1Cn3 . In a price-rise phase, the phase terminates with Event 3. Since no good
leaves Γ(S) during a phase and prices monotonically increase, Event 3 implies that price of at least
one good has increased by xmax. This proves the first part.
For the second part, the phase terminates either due to Event 2 or breaking from the inner loop
(in line 18). For the latter case, there is a way to adjust the flow so that the surplus of an agent
i ∈ S becomes equal to either zero if S = A or the surplus of an agent i′ /∈ S. Furthermore, the
flow adjustment maintains that the surplus of each agent i ∈ S increases by a factor of at most xmax,
surpluses of agents outside S does not decrease, and the total surplus does not increase. This is a
similar situation like Event 2, so we can prove this case by the proof of Event 2 case.
Let f ′′ be the intermediate flow just before computing a balanced flow in line 21. If Event 2
occurs, then it implies that p′j ≤ xmaxpj,∀j. Since pj and fij are increased by the same factor
x,∀i ∈ S,∀j ∈ Γ(S), and the flow update in line 19 can only decrease the surplus of agents in S,
we have ci(p′, f ′′) ≤ xmaxci(p, f),∀i ∈ S. There are two cases: either the surplus of an agent i ∈ S
becomes zero if S = A or it becomes equal to surplus of an agent i′ /∈ S.
For the first case, we have ci(p′, f ′′) = 0 and cj(p′, f ′′) ≤ xmaxcj(p, f),∀j ∈ S. This implies that
‖c(p′, f ′′)‖2
2
≤ x2max‖c(p, f)‖
2
2
− ci(p, f)
2 .
Lemma A.2 implies that ci(p, f) ≥ ‖c(p, f)‖1/(e · n). Using this, we get
‖c(p′, f ′′)‖2
2
≤ ‖c(p, f)‖2
2
((
1 +
1
Cn3
)2
−
1
e2n2
)
.
Simplifying above using C = 56e2, we get
‖c(p′, f ′′)‖2
2
≤
(
1 +
3
Cn3
−
56
Cn3
)
‖c(p, f)‖2
2
≤
(
1−
4
Cn3
)
‖c(p, f)‖2
2
.
Further, we obtain
‖c(p′, f ′′)‖2 ≤
√(
1−
4
Cn3
)
‖c(p, f)‖2 ≤
(
1−
2
Cn3
)
‖c(p, f)‖2 ≤
‖c(p, f)‖2(
1 + 1
Cn3
) .
Since ‖c(p′, f ′)‖2 ≤ ‖c(p
′, f ′′)‖2 , we get ‖c(p
′, f ′)‖2 ≤ ‖c(p, f)‖2/
(
1 + 1
Cn3
)
.
For the second case, we have mini∈S ci(p′, f ′′) = maxi 6∈S ci(p′, f ′′). There are two types of agents
in S: i such that gi ∈ Γ(S) (type 1) and i such that gi /∈ Γ(S) (type 2). The price and flow update in
line 8 increases the surpluses of type 1 agents and decreases the surpluses of type 2 agents. Since the
price and flow is updated by the same factor x, the surpluses of type 1 agents increase by the same
factor x.
Since the surpluses of agents outside S does not decrease, and the total surplus monotonically
decreases, the total increase in the surpluses of agents outside S is at most the total decrease in
the surpluses of type 2 agents. For simplicity, let w1, . . . , wℓ and u1, . . . , uk denote the surpluses
of type 1 and type 2 agents at (p, f) respectively. Similarly, let v1, . . . , vo denote the surpluses of
agents outside S at (p, f). Clearly, we have l + k + o = n. Define w¯ = miniwi, u¯ = mini ui, v¯ =
maxj vj . Let R = min{u¯, w¯}. From the definition of S, we have R > (1 + 1/n)v¯. At (p′, f ′′), let
u′1, . . . , u
′
k, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
l, v
′
1, . . . , v
′
o are the surpluses of type 1, type 2, and agents outside S respectively.
From the above discussion, we have
w′i ≤ xmaxwi,∀i, and u
′
i ≤ ui,∀i and v
′
i ≥ vi,∀i .
Let u′i = ui − δi,∀i and v
′
j = vj + δ
′
j ,∀j, where δi, δ
′
j ≥ 0,∀i, j. Further, we have w
′
i ≥ v
′
i,∀i,
u′i ≥ v
′
i,∀i, and
∑
i δi ≥
∑
j δ
′
j . Since R − v ≥ R/(n + 1) and Event 2 occurred, we have
∑
i δi ≥
R/(2(n + 1)). Using Lemma A.1, we get
‖u′‖2
2
+ ‖v′‖2
2
≤ ‖u‖2
2
+ ‖v‖2
2
−
R2
2(n + 1)2
.
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Recall that w′i ≤ xmaxwi,∀i, and let us use the trivial upper bound ‖w‖
2
2
≤ ‖c(p, f)‖2
2
. Together
with the above inequality, we obtain
‖c(p′, f ′′)‖2
2
= ‖w′‖2
2
+ ‖u′‖2
2
+ ‖v′‖2
2
≤ x2max‖w‖
2
2
+ ‖u‖2
2
+ ‖v‖2
2
−
R2
2(n+ 1)2
≤
(
1 +
1
Cn3
)2
‖c(p, f)‖2
2
−
R2
2(n+ 1)2
.
From Lemma A.2, we have ‖c(p, f)‖2
2
≤ ne2R2. Hence,
‖c(p′, f ′′)‖2
2
≤ ‖c(p, f)‖2
2
((
1 +
1
Cn3
)2
−
1
2e2n(n+ 1)2
)
≤
‖c(p, f)‖2
(1 + 4Cn3 )
,
where the last inequality used that C = 56e2. We obtain
‖c(p′, f ′′)‖2 ≤
‖c(p, f)‖2√
1 + 4
Cn3
≤
‖c(p, f)‖2
1 + 1Cn3
.
Finally, since ‖c(p′, f ′)‖2 ≤ ‖c(p
′, f ′′)‖2 , we get ‖c(p
′, f ′)‖2 ≤ ‖c(p, f)‖2/
(
1 + 1Cn3
)
.
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